INTRODUCTION
It is trite to say that the adjudication of socio-economic rights is a new enterprise in South African jurisprudence, as it is to the jurisprudence of many other jurisdictions.
Professor van Rensburg's paper seeks to analyse the influence of political, socioeconomic and cultural considerations on the interpretation and application of socioeconomic rights in the Bill of Rights. The pivots for discussion are the decisions of the Constitutional Court in the Soobramoney, 
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SOOBRAMONEY
To a large extent, Soobramoney is a somewhat unfair template upon which to construct any analysis of the approach of the Constitutional Court to socio-economic adjudication primarily because it is the very first case that the Court, with virtually no institutional experience in socio-economic adjudication, was being asked to chart new territory. Nonetheless, the Court's interpretation of section 27 can scarcely escape criticism.
Professor van Rensburg is right in lamenting the extent to which the Court interpreted section 27(3). The Court unduly minimised the relevance of section 11 -the right to life -to the section 27(3) argument that the state had a duty not to refuse the appellant medical treatment.
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The Court also categorically interpreted section 27(3) as a negative rather than a positive right to the extent of perhaps undermining the import of the duties of health care providers.
5
Even conceding that chronic renal failure of the type that the appellant was afflicted with did not constitute a medical emergency as contemplated by section 27(3), 6 the effect of the Court's interpretation was to cast the provisions of the Bill of Rights as atomistic elements rather than units of an interconnected web. Indeed, it is not inappropriate to interpret the Court's approach to section 27(3) as legalistic to the extent that it detracted from the generous purposive/contextual approach to constitutional interpretation that is out of synchrony with the Courts own professed approach or human rights jurisprudence in general.
7
Fear that a holistic line of interpretation might lead to consumers of health care services making additional demand on the state should not have dissuaded the
Court from interpreting section 27(3) as a positive right that is in part animated by section 11 -the right to life. Socio-economic rights draw sustenance from the imposition of positive obligations. It means precious little say that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment and yet decline to impose on health care providers a positive duty to make such treatment available. Scott and Alston have described the Courts approach as constituting "negative textual inferentialism". 4 Soobramoney (note 1) para 15. 5 Ibid para 20. 6 The appellant was suffering from end-stage renal failure. He was also suffering from coronary artery disease, ischaemic heart disease and diabetes and hypertension. He had a history of a stroke. On account of this medical history, he was not a candidate for a kidney transplant for the reason that he had a very poor prognosis.
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The proper way to limit the appellants demand for renal dialysis should not have been an attempt to resurrect a literal approach but an application of section 27 (2) which renders the provision of health care resources subject to available resources. 
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Notwithstanding that courts are not particularly suited to involving themselves in matters of budgetary appropriations, there must, nonetheless, be an inclination on part of the court to impugn executive and medical decisions about the allocation of resources. As the Court itself reiterated in Treatment Action Campaign, as long as executive policy impacts on the respect, promotion, protection and fulfilment of fundamental rights, the doctrine of separation of powers cannot be delineated by rigid boundaries.
10
The task of the judiciary is no longer to conduct review the traditional sense and inquire only into the form of executive policy decision. The substance has become as important as the form. Rationality and good faith are no longer sufficient conditions. The reasonableness of the decision must now be guided by constitutional benchmarks and, foremost, by the obligations placed on the state by the Constitution.
Health intertwines with many others sectors. It is dependent upon many factors and not just health care services. It belongs to both the private and the public domain. In this regard, Sachs J's observation that the courts are not the proper place to resolve agonising personal and medical problems that underlie allocations of resources and that the courts cannot replace the more intimate struggle that must be borne by the patient, those caring for the patient and those who care about the patient, may seem to be an appropriate reflection of a practical reality.
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At the same time, however, the remark by the learned judge can be (mis)construed as relegating the provision of health care to the private rather than the public domain and insufficiently vindicating access to health as a human right. Madala J in his supporting judgment went as far as describing rights as the "ideal" and "something to be strived for" to the extent of perhaps diminishing the status of socio-economic rights from enforceable rights to mere aspirations.
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The acknowledgement in the Bill of Rights of health care as a fundamental right conspicuously represents a broadening of government responsibility. Whilst the responsibilities of individuals, families, private charities and religious organisations are not being effaced, nonetheless, health has become a major governmental responsibility unlike in the past. With all its inherent problems, health has become part of the more inclusive understanding of human rights and constitutional adjudication of socio-economic rights must faithfully reflect this shift, even at semantic level. What has been done in execution of the programme is a major achievement. Large sums of money have been spent and a significant number of houses have been built. Considerable thought, energy, resources, and expertise have been and continue to be devoted towards the process of effective house delivery. It is a programme that is aimed at achieving the progressive realisation of the right to adequate housing. 14 13 Chapman 'Core obligations related to the right to health and their relevance for South Africa' in Brand and Russell (eds) Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: (2002) 38. 14 Grootboom (note 2) para 53.
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One can surmise that had the programme not been thought out rationally and executed in good faith, by for example not involving all spheres of government or targeting beneficiaries on account of race, then it would not have passed the hurdle of rationality and good faith and it would have been unnecessary to inquire into substantive reasonableness. 15 At para 47 Jacoob said "All spheres of government are intimately involved in housing delivery and the budget allocated by national government appears substantial. There is a single housing policy and a subsidy system that targets low income earners regardless of race".
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The one area perhaps in which Grootboom spoke with hesitancy rather than forthrightness relates to core minimum entitlements and core minimum obligations.
The Court was right in suggesting that the idea of core minimum should be seen as an integral part of rather than independent from the reasonableness inquiry. There is indeed no suggestion in General Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that the concept of minimum core obligations should be used to found a free standing rights. What the concept does, however, is to provide an indication for establishing prima facie evidence of non-compliance with socioeconomic obligations. Once the prima facie evidence has been established, the onus then shifts to the state to offer a rebuttal by demonstrating that despite taking all reasonable measures at its disposal, it has nevertheless failed to meet even rudimentary needs. This is apparent from the following observations that the Committee made in paragraph 10 of General Comment 3:
Thus, for example, a State in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary healthcare, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education, is prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not tot establish such a minimum core obligation, it would largely be deprived of its raison d'être. By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a state has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within the country. …In order for a State Party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources, it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.
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The concept of minimum core obligations is no more that a tool for impressing upon states that to protect human dignity they should at least endeavour to do the little they can even in the face of economic and other constraints. The problem in Grootboom, however, is that the Court did not have at its disposal the content of minimum core obligations in respect of the housing. Core minimum obligations should not differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction or place to place, as the Court in Grootboom appears to have understood. Treatment Action Campaign, however, perpetuates a misunderstanding of the import of the concept of minimum core rights and obligations. The Court was reluctant to embrace the concept of minimum core obligations because it believed that this would mean that for every socio-economic rights, they would be a free standing minimum right.
18
As submitted earlier this is a misconstruction of paragraph 10 of General Comment 3. Professor van Rensburg endorsement of the Court's approach in this regard, also seems to repeat the misconception.
Concluding remarks
Professor van Rensburg paper had the difficult challenge of attempting to analyse a jurisprudence that is very much in the making. Some of the contours of that
jurisprudence have yet to be clear. The cases upon which to analyse the approach and contribution of the Court are still sparse.
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Notwithstanding this limitation, Professor van Rensburg is justified in treating 
